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INTRODUCTION
The traditional account of corporate reorganizations assumes a financially
distressed business faces three conditions simultaneously: (1) It has substantial
value as a going concern; (2) its investors cannot sort out the financial distress
through ordinary bargaining and instead require Chapter 11 's collective forum;
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and (3) the business cannot be readily sold in the market as a going concern.
Remove any one of these conditions, and the standard account of corporate
reorganization law falters. In The End of Bankruptcy, we showed that any one
of these conditions is rarely found in a financially distressed business today. It
is even less likely that all three of them will exist at the same time. Hence,
modern Chapter 11 practice cannot be squared with the traditional account.1
Regardless of whether the number of businesses entering Chapter 11 rises or
falls, 2 something different is going on.
In his thoughtful Response, Lynn LoPucki urges us to provide a more
rigorous empirical grounding for these ideas. 3 Part I of this Reply provides
such a foundation. It reviews all the large Chapter 11 cases that concluded in
2002.4 As we claimed in The End of Bankruptcy, traditional reorganizations
have largely disappeared. Put concretely, in 84% of all large Chapter 1 ls from
2002, the investors entered bankruptcy with a deal in hand or used it to sell the
assets of the business. In the remaining cases, going-concern value was small or
nonexistent. 5
Central to the ideas presented in The End of Bankruptcy was the
relationship between the different sources of going-concern value and financial
distress. Part II returns to this theme. It grounds our conception of going-
concern value. We use a case LoPucki brought to our attention to illustrate why
financially distressed businesses often have so little value as going concerns
1. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L.
REv. 751 (2002).
2. The number of aggregate Chapter 11 filings continues to drop. It has fallen in half
over the last two decades, and the number continues to decline. According to figures
available from the American Bankruptcy Institute, there were 3022 Chapter 11 filings in the
first quarter of 2002, and 2487 in the first quarter of 2003, a decrease of 17.7%. These
figures include a small number of Chapter 11 filings by individuals. For the 12 month period
ending June 30, 2003, business filings were down by 5.2%.
3. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and
Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645 (2003).
4. There is no particular magic to this dataset, but it is one logical way to obtain a
representative set of recent large Chapter I Is. LoPucki uses this same dataset at the start of
his essay and returns to it a number of times.
5. Recently, many others have also come to recognize that Chapter 11 has undergone
major change. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party in Possession,
22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 12 (2003); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Waisman, The Erosion of
Debtor Protections in the Face of Expanding Creditors Rights and Control, Remarks at the
NYU Workshop on Bankruptcy and Business Reorganization (Sept. 2, 2003).
Measuring the precise extent of the changes and when they occurred is hard, but the
BRD provides an easy, albeit approximate benchmark. According to the BRD, during the
1980s, 88% of the large businesses entering Chapter 11 began without either a prepackaged
or prenegotiated plan and emerged as operating companies. By 2002, the percentage had
fallen to 24%. As LoPucki notes, such comparisons, while useful, must be used with some
caution. Among other things, the categories used in the BRD do not track the idea of asset
sales or preexisting deals precisely and provide no measure for whether any business has
value as a going concern. Nevertheless, the ability of the BRD to provide such comparisons
quickly is one of its many strengths.
[Vol. 56:673
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and why whatever value exists is usually best preserved through a sale.
In Part III, we revisit the control that creditors exercise before bankruptcy,
during it, and afterward. The powers they enjoy reduce the work that Chapter
11 can perform as well as the powers that others (such as the board of directors)
are able to exercise. Again, the facts speak for themselves. Even in the cases
most resembling the traditional reorganization, creditor control is the dominant
theme. Indeed, if the experience of large businesses leaving Chapter I 1 in 2002
is any guide, those at the helm do the bidding of the creditors throughout the
case. Moreover, by the end of the case, the creditors usually acquire the right to
appoint a new board of directors. They commonly appoint themselves or others
(such as their employees) whom they can trust to protect their interests.
Corporate reorganizations today are the legal vehicles by which creditors in
control decide which course of action-sale, prearranged deal, or a conversion
of debt to a controlling equity stake-will maximize their return.
I. LARGE BUSINESS CHAPTER 1IS IN 2002
In 2002, 93 large businesses completed their Chapter 11 proceedings. 6 Of
these, 52 (or 56% of the sample) were sales of one sort or another. In 45 of
these cases, there was a sale of assets such that the business did not even
emerge intact as an independent entity under a plan of reorganization. 7 In
6. The BRD database shows 94 cases wrapped up in 2002. One, however, was an
involuntary Chapter 11 case that was dismissed. In that case, the debtor, Huntsman, later
reached a consensual restructuring with its creditors outside of bankruptcy.
LoPucki notes (on many occasions) that the number of large Chapter 11 cases has risen
sharply in recent years. LoPucki's emphasis on this increase, however, is puzzling. The End
of Bankruptcy claims we no longer need the Chapter 11 collective process to preserve the
value of financially distressed businesses as going concerns. At the same time, it shows that
Chapter 11 is playing other roles. Modem Chapter 11 is now an attractive place to sell a
business as a going concern, and it allows creditors to overcome the problems created by the
Trust Indenture Act. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 786-88. An increase in the
number of large Chapter I Is that use bankruptcy for these or other nontraditional purposes is
completely consistent with the idea that few financially distressed businesses have
substantial going-concern value, cannot be sold, and have problems creditors cannot
navigate outside a collective proceeding.
LoPucki also offers some explanations for the recent rise in Chapter 11 filings. He
agrees that judges are increasingly willing to conduct sales. In addition, LoPucki suggests
that ill-advised merger and acquisition activity may have also brought more cases to Chapter
11. We are less confident that this last observation and others he makes are on the mark. But
even if they are, they do nothing to undercut (and indeed may even support) the central claim
made in The End of Bankruptcy--that, in the current mix of cases in Chapter 11, there are
vanishingly few financially distressed businesses that have going-concern value, require a
collective proceeding, and cannot be sold as going concerns. Again, the traditional account
depends upon a conjunction of these three conditions. Merely showing cases in which one or
two of them exist is insufficient.
7. The BRD codes 43 of the corporations as "not emerging." In none of these was the
business reorganized in the traditional sense. The assets of the business were sold or, in some
cases, turned over to secured creditors. We have added the two cases that liquidated in
December 2003]
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addition to these clear cases of asset sales, seven other cases were in substance
sales even though the business did emerge as a stand-alone enterprise under a
plan of reorganization. 8 We review each of these seven cases briefly. They
provide a nice illustration of modem Chapter 11 practice.
Fruit of the Loom filed for Chapter 11 at the end of 1999. From the
beginning, the senior creditors exercised control. They planned initially to take
a controlling equity interest in the company, but when competing bidders
appeared, they were content for the bankruptcy court to conduct a sale. Warren
Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway proved to be the high bidder at $800 million in
cash.9 Similarly, George St. Laurent was the high bidder for Fine Air
Services. 1 0
In Sterling Chemicals, the court oversaw the sale of one-half of the
company, and the proceeds went to the secured creditors. A new investor
Chapter 11-ProMedCo and Xpedior-that the BRD does not code as either "emerging" or
"not emerging."
The BRD tries to measure whether a sale is contemplated at the time of the
reorganization by looking primarily at SEC disclosures and public announcements in the
press. It suggests that about 40% of the sales that took place in Chapter 11 were
contemplated at the time of the petition. This figure is a lower bound. Financially distressed
businesses often do not publicize sales in advance. (Among other things, giving the
impression that you are committed to a speedy sale may dampen how much others are
willing to bid.)
To give only one example, the BRD codes Budget's Chapter 11 sale as not planned in
advance. Given the BRD's protocols, this coding is defensible, but it does not capture the
dynamic in the case. Budget's Chapter 11 was intended from the start to consummate the
sale to Avis. Budget's negotiations with Avis were public a month before it filed its petition,
and Avis entered into a formal agreement to buy Budget only several weeks after the
petition. A closer look shows that the Chapter 11 and the sale were conceived together.
Among other things, the DIP financing was conditioned on the sale to Avis going through.
8. The BRD codes a business as "emerging" if it emerged pursuant to a confirmed
Chapter 11 plan as long as the formal transfer of ownership is done in a plan and as long as
the buyer maintains the business as a discrete legal entity. For this reason, some businesses
that are sold are coded as "emerging." For example, a buyer can buy the business for cash,
but ask (typically for tax reasons) that, instead of a transfer of the physical assets, it acquire
ownership of the equity of the reorganized business under a plan of reorganization. Hence, to
identify all the cases of asset sales, one has to supplement the businesses that did not
"emerge" within the meaning of the BRD with those that the BRD codes as "emerging" but
which were nevertheless sold to a third party for cash.
9. In a similar vein, Seitel, whose primary business is selling seismic data to oil and
gas companies, had assets that it valued at $398 million when it filed for bankruptcy on July
21, 2003. Under the terms of its prepackaged bankruptcy, Berkshire Hathaway is financing
the plan of reorganization and will receive 100% of the equity of the reorganized business.
See BANKR. WK., July 28, 2003, at 1, 5.
10. See Brendan Sobie, New Partnership Forged in Competition to Buy Fine Air, AIR
TRANSPORT INTELLIGENCE, Jan. 30, 2002. It is worth noting that a minority investor who
invested $2.5 million in the new corporation that proved to be the winning bidder was the
old equityholder. He received a seat on the board and 24% of the equity in exchange. If one
collapses the transactions together, Fine Air is, in effect, a new value plan that satisfies the
requirements of Bank of America v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 434
(1999).
[Vol. 56:673
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acquired most of the equity of the remaining business, with the balance going
to the unsecured creditors. The equity was wiped out, and, as provided in the
plan of reorganization, the entire board of directors tendered their resignations.
The new investor controlled the appointment of their successors. II Similarly, a
distressed-debt fund acquired control of Classic Communications in Chapter 11
and became its owner as part of the reorganization plan. 12
Global Crossing, one of the largest bankruptcies ever, was from the start a
sale of the business to a new investor. 13 After delays and a search for other
bidders, the bankruptcy court confirmed a plan of reorganization that consisted
primarily of a purchase agreement under which the prebankruptcy suitor would
receive 60% of the equity in exchange for several hundred million dollars in
cash. 14
Derby Cycle entered Chapter 11 as the second part of a plan, conceived by
its investment bankers many months before, to sell its assets. The bankruptcy
court approved the asset sale within five weeks of the petition. In the words of
Derby's investment banker, "[B]ankruptcy can be a tool to get a transaction
done .... This was a situation where it made a lot of sense for a lot of reasons
to file for bankruptcy. But the primary reason was speed-we were just able to
[do] the transaction a lot more quickly."' 5
XO Communications filed for Chapter 11 with two alternative plans in
hand. 16 The first was a deal by which Fortsmann Little would make a
11. See Press Release, Sterling Chemicals, Sterling Chemicals Emerges from
Bankruptcy with $60 Million in New Equity (Dec. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.newswire.ca/en (last visited Nov. 29, 2003). Five of the nine-member board of
Sterling consists of the members of Resurgence Asset Management, which invested $60
million in the business. Information on the board of directors can be found at
http://www.sterlingchemicals.com (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
12. Mike Farrell, Classic Emerges with New Owners, $80M, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
Jan. 6, 2003. In the plan, the buyer acquired a majority of the seats on the board, and its
principal became chairman. Within six weeks of confirmation, the fund transferred the
management of the company to an experienced cable operator. Jerri Stroud, Kent Makes
Another Comeback, Diving into Cable Business Again, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 13,
2003, at Cl.
13. See Dennis K. Berman, Phillip Day & Henry Sender, Global Crossing Ltd. Files
for Bankruptcy WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2002, at A3; Christopher Palmeri & Lorraine Woellert,
Global Crossing: A Matter of National Security?, Bus. WK., Aug. 11, 2003, at 32.
14. Like many acquisitions outside of bankruptcy, the sale took the form of the
acquisition of a majority stake in the equity of the reorganized business. A number of terms
changed (including a dramatic decrease in the amount of cash that the new buyer put on the
table) because the financial condition of Global Crossing changed over the course of the
chase. Global Crossing's Plan of Reorganization was confirmed on December 26, 2002. The
Plan included a purchase agreement that set forth the terms of the acquisition, pending
regulatory approval. See Ron Orol, FCC Approves Global Crossing Sale, DAILY DEAL, Oct.
10, 2003.
15. Mairin Bums, Corporate Restructuring Takes a Transatlantic Turn; European
Bicycle Maker Derby Cycle Reorganizes Stateside Via Chapter 11, HIGH YIELD REP., Nov. 5,
2001.
16. XO Communications was a holding company. Its subsidiaries provided telephone
December 20031
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significant investment in exchange for control. The second was one that would
wipe out equity and convert the bank debt to equity. Fortsmann Little decided
not to go through with the deal, and Carl Icahn bought a majority of the
company's debt. Ownership of XO Communications passed to him upon
confirmation. The company exited Chapter 11 in early 2003, and Icahn remains
its owner.
We now turn to the cases (less than half the population) that were not asset
sales. In most of these, the principal investors reached agreement with each
other on a plan of reorganization before the Chapter 11 was filed, and that plan
or one very much like it was confirmed in Chapter 11. All told, the Chapter 11
of 26 of the 42 businesses that were not sold in Chapter 11 merely implemented
a deal that was already reached among the principal players at the time the
petition was filed. 17 Three of the cases were ones in which the bankruptcy
judge confirmed a prepackaged plan. 18 In 19 others, a prenegotiated plan was
confirmed with only minor modifications. 19 In four additional cases, the court
service. None of the operating subsidiaries filed for bankruptcy. See Roy Mark, XO Files for
Bankruptcy Protection, (June 18, 2002), at http://www.isp-planet.com/news/2002/xo02061
8.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
17. XO Communications entered Chapter 11 with a prenegotiated plan, but that deal
fell apart and the business was sold instead. It, too, is excluded from our count of businesses
that entered Chapter 11 to implement preexisting deals. Again, there is no problem with the
coding of the BRD, but it takes account only of whether a business enters with a deal in
hand, not whether it was in fact implemented. Hence, we exclude it from our count of the
Chapter I Is in which the judge implements a preexisting deal.
18. These were Leiner Health Products, APW Ltd., and Globix. The BRD identifies
one other case--Glenoit-as a prepackaged plan, but the plan fell apart in bankruptcy.
Hence, Glenoit was properly coded as a "prepackaged" Chapter 11 in the BRD but again
should not be counted as a Chapter Il that implemented a preexisting deal.
19. These businesses were AMF Bowling, Anchor Glass, Arch Wireless, Audio Visual
Services, Chiquita, Guilford Mills, Impsat Fiber Network, ITC DeltaCom, Inc., Lason,
McLeodUSA, Mpower Holding, NTL, Oxford Automotive, Stockwalk Group,
USlnterNetworking, Verado, Williams Communications, Worldtex, and York Research. The
BRD codes all of these as prenegotiated plans except for Arch Wireless, Oxford, and York
Research. These three cases, however, should also be seen as Chapter lls in which the
bankruptcy judge implemented a preexisting deal.
Arch Wireless's Chapter 11 implemented a plan negotiated with its secured creditors
before the bankruptcy, under which the secured creditors received new notes and 90% of the
equity of the reorganized business. Unsecured creditors received a few cents on the dollar
and old shareholders received nothing. Leon Lazaroff, Arch Wireless Plans Bankruptcy with
Creditors' Backing, DAILY DEAL, Dec. 6, 2001; News Notes, Arch Wireless, BANKR.
DATASOURCE, Apr. 1, 2002.
Oxford Automotive spent a year planning its Chapter 11, and it filed to implement a
debt restructuring agreement with CSFB Global. Before the Chapter 11 began, at a time
when it held 80% of Oxford's outstanding bonds, Global agreed to exchange its bonds and
invest $50 million for a majority equity interest in the reorganized company. The Chapter 11
put this deal in place. Oxford Automotive Arranges for Significant Capital Investment, PR
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 18, 2002; Michael Strong, Oxford Automotive: Ch. 11 Plan Will Pay
Vendors in Full, CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus., Jan. 28, 2002, at 33.
York Research, a developer of energy production facilities, entered into a restructuring
[Vol. 56:673
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confirmed plans that adhered to the basic contours of the deal brokered before
the petition was filed, albeit with some alterations.20
The large Chapter I Is of 2002 confirm our claim in The End of Bankruptcy
that going-concern sales and implementation of prenegotiated deals now
dominate the scene. 21 More precisely, 52 of the 93 large reorganizations in
2002 were sales of one sort or another. Of the remaining 41 cases, 26 (or 62%)
were situations where the bankruptcy merely put in place a deal agreed to
before the proceedings began. Combined, sales and preexisting deals account
for 84% of the large Chapter 1 Is from 2002.22
agreement with 99% of its portfolio bondholders before filing, and this agreement was
implemented in Chapter 11. As provided in the agreement, existing plants were sold (with
proceeds going to the bondholders). Projects under development were to be placed into a
new business owned by the creditors and the existing management. Shareholders were wiped
out. Plan Summary, York Research Corporation, et al., BANKR. DATASOURCE, Aug. 15,
2002; York Announces Restructuring Agreement with Bondholders; Filing of Bankruptcy
Petition, Bus. WIRE, June 7, 2002.
20. The four cases were Sunbeam, WKI Holding, Komag, and Pinnacle Holdings. In
Sunbeam, out-of-the-money subordinated debenture holders were able to extract 1.5% of the
equity by claiming rights arising out of prepetition financial misdeeds. See Sunbeam
Announces Court's Confirmation of Plan of Reorganization, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 25, 2002.
In WKI Holding, some bondholders increased their stake of the new equity from 5.1% to
8.35% by threatening to probe transactions between its parent and an affiliate of the parent
that was also a secured lender to the debtor. See Soma Biswas, World Kitchen Reorg Plan
OK'd, DAILY DEAL, Nov. 16, 2002. In Komag, the general outline of the plan remained the
same even while a number of details changed. The senior lenders received less cash ($82.5
million instead of $85 million) and more stock (51.4% instead of 50.1%), and one class of
claims was split into two. Compare Plan Summary, Komag, Incorporated, BANKR.
DATASOURCE, Nov. 1, 2001, with Plan Summary, Komag, Incorporated, BANKR.
DATASOURCE, Mar. 1, 2002. In Pinnacle Holdings, the prenegotiated plan provided for the
acquisition of control of the equity by a new investor and a new credit facility. The plans for
the new credit facility fell through, and the preexisting senior lenders did the postpetition
financing instead. The change affected only the senior lenders (the ones involved in shaping
the prenegotiated plan), and the essence of the plan-the transfer of control of the business
to the specified third party-took place as contemplated and according to the terms agreed
upon before the case was filed. See Jonathan Berke, Pinnacle Banks to Vote on Plan, DAILY
DEAL, Sept. 25, 2002.
21. There is one other case that, while neither a sale nor a preexisting plan, evinces the
same dynamic. WebLink Wireless planned to enter Chapter 11 in order to merge with
another business. Metrocall & WebLink Agree to Merge, Bus. WIRE, Apr. 2, 2001. This deal
fell apart, but WebLink entered Chapter 11 and continued to look for a buyer. WebLink
Wireless Prepares to File Plan to Emerge from Chapter 11, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 31, 2001.
Another deal with a different buyer fell through during the course of the case. News Notes,
WebLink Wireless, Inc., BANKR. DATASOURCE, July 1, 2002 (citing WebLink Wireless's
January 31, 2002, announcement that it had filed a plan of reorganization and had signed a
letter of intent with Sun Capital Acquisition). When WebLink emerged from bankruptcy, its
secured creditor owned the equity and controlled the newly formed board of directors.
Within four months, the secured creditor sold its controlling interest to a third party, which
then took over the company. Leucadia National Corporation Announces Six Month 2003
Results, Bus. WIRE, Aug. 13, 2003. Just to be clear, we have not counted this case as either a
sale or a preexisting deal in obtaining our 84% figure.
22. As we have already noted, the BRD provides an easy way to approximate this
December 2003]
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We now turn to the handful that remain, the large Chapter 11 cases from
2002 that were neither sales nor preexisting deals. Only in these few cases
might a traditional reorganization be found, yet they share in common one
characteristic-a remarkable absence of going-concern value. We go through
each of these cases in turn.
Two of the businesses-Viatel and Teligent-were so transformed during
the course of the Chapter 11 that the emerging entities could hardly be
considered the same businesses at all. Far from preserving going-concern value,
whatever value the old businesses had as going concerns disappeared during
the course of the reorganization. Viatel entered Chapter 11 as an international
long-distance telecommunications business headquartered in New York with
2000 employees. 23 It emerged thirteen months later as a business, based in
England, that employed only 73 workers and specialized in the sale of fiber
optic capacity to long-distance carriers and large corporations. It no longer has
any assets in the United States. 24 Teligent entered Chapter 11 with 2000
employees as a business trying to use wireless technology to compete with
local telephone companies. It emerged as a company with fewer than 100
employees that is trying to use its wireless licenses to provide transport services
to other carriers and point-to-point broadband access services for multilocation
businesses. 25 What is going on in Chapter 11 in these cases may be entirely
salutary, but it has nothing to do with preserving the businesses that entered
Chapter 11.
Two other cases show a similar absence of going-concem value. In one
(Glenoit), most of the business's plants located in the United States were shut
down immediately after leaving Chapter 11. After leaving bankruptcy,
production was moved to China, and the remaining sites in the United States
are now used primarily as warehouses and distribution centers. 26 If the business
number. The percentage of cases in which the business emerges without a prepackaged or
prenegotiated plan in hand at the outset is 24%. The remaining 76% corresponds (albeit
imperfectly) to the 84% we find here. For reasons discussed earlier, the BRD is both
underinclusive (e.g., Fruit of the Loom) and overinclusive (e.g., Glenoit).
23. Viatel was put up for auction. After the creditors committee rejected a $150 million
bid as inadequate, the original bidder dropped out, and no other bids materialized. See
Mitchell Pacelle & Richard B. Schmitt, Bankruptcy Pro Seeks Career Reorganization, at
http://www.careerjoumal.com/myc/killers/20020301-pacelle.html (last visited Nov. 29,
2003). There was also to be an auction for Teligent in the bankruptcy court, "but no one else
showed up." Teligent to Revamp According to Plan ... Sort of at
http://www.cedmagazine.com/cedailydirect/0201/cedaily020124.htm (last visited Nov. 29,
2003).
24. Leon Lazaroff, Viatel Set to Exit Chapter 11, DAILY DEAL, May 10, 2002.
25. Yuki Noguchi, Teligent Exits Chapter 11 Debt-Free, NEWSBYTES, Sept. 13, 2002;
Teligent Completes Its Reorganization-Company Exits Bankruptcy Fully Funded and Debt
Free, Bus. WIRE, Sept. 12, 2002. The general creditors, like the shareholders, received
nothing. Indeed, the case was administratively insolvent. See In re Teligent, Inc., 282 B.R.
765 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
26. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Burlington Made to Order for Investor Seeking a Test,
[Vol. 56:673
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had value as a going concern, it would not have shut down its domestic
operations and recreated them abroad. Another case had little in the way of an
ongoing business at all. FLAG's principal assets were three separate undersea
fiber optic cables. 27 Each could have been sold separately or transferred to the
creditor that held the senior interest in them. These assets have no synergies
between them. If Chapter 11 did not exist, little would have been lost.
Six of the remaining businesses were little more than groups of discrete
businesses, each of which could stand on its own. Three were a collection of
nursing homes and residential care facilities, 28 one was managed vacation
resorts scattered across the country, another was a chain of movie theaters. 29
Still another operated several dozen hotels under several different franchise
names. This last business (Lodgian) nicely illustrates what is at stake in such
cases.
A business such as Lodgian has value as a going concern only to the extent
there are synergies when one company runs a Holiday Inn in Myrtle Beach, a
Hilton in Fort Wayne, a Radisson in Phoenix, and many others scattered around
the country. Independent of Lodgian, each hotel enjoys the services its own
franchisor provides. Holiday Inn, Hilton, and Radisson each have their own
national reservation systems as well as marketing and advertising programs. A
creditor of Lodgian can foreclose on the equity Lodgian holds in the
corporation that runs the Holiday Inn in Richfield, Ohio, and that Holiday Inn
would still remain open for business, employing the same people.30 The
individual hotels are separate corporations that stand on their own.
To determine Lodgian's going-concern value, we have to isolate the
business of Lodgian proper. Lodgian can enter into single contracts with food,
telephone, and software providers. It can provide centralized accounting, tax,
and payroll services. It can help train employees. If Lodgian can provide such
services more cheaply than others, it may have value as a going concern. But
we have to focus on these services, not on the underlying assets that stand on
their own. Lodgian is a business employing the 118 people in Atlanta who
oversee a portfolio of 97 hotels. Not at risk is the value of the hotels and their
operations. These are discrete businesses that together employ 5000 people and
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2003, at C1.
27. Tola Sargeant & Anthony Cox, No Silver Lining for Subsea-Cable Industry as
FLAG Files for Chapter 11, TELECOM MARKETS, Apr. 22, 2002.
28. These were Sun HealthCare, Mariner Post-Acute Network, and CareMatrix.
29. These were Sunterra and Carmike Cinema respectively. Carmike Cinema was able
to pay its creditors in full in large part because it was able to use Chapter 11 to extricate
itself from real estate leases. Taking advantage of substantive rules in Chapter 11 that depart
from the nonbankruptcy baseline rather than a need to preserve going-concern value seems
to have driven its Chapter 11 filing.
30. As part of its reorganization plan, Lodgian returned several hotel properties,
including its Holiday Inn in Richfield, Ohio, to its secured creditors. The one in Richfield
remains a Holiday Inn. Nothing suggests that it is worse off now that it lacks Lodgian's
services.
December 2003]
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generate $400 million of revenue a year.3 1
Lodgian is emblematic of many of the businesses that emerged intact from
Chapter 11 in 2002. They are not like nineteenth century railroads or the large
factory in a small town frequently put forward as the archetypal Chapter 11.
These businesses do not resemble a steel mill where the physical assets have
little value and jobs disappear if the business shuts down. More often, the value
that is being preserved is not the underlying hotel, theater, or nursing home but
the value of having them under common ownership.
We are left with four cases. Going-concern value may exist in ICG
Communications, Kitty Hawk, Metals USA, and Pillowtex. In these cases,
however, one is hard put to find all the conditions that the traditional
justification of corporate reorganizations requires. Creditors exercise control
that investors in nineteenth century railroads could only dream of. Far from
being a last resort, the sale gives creditors a benchmark they can use to assess
whether they are better off converting their claims to equity and appointing a
new board of directors to oversee the enterprise, at least for a time.
In ICG Communications, for example, we see senior creditors in control of
the process. By the time it entered Chapter 11, a new CEO, recommended by
one of the principal creditors, had been put in place. 32 Once in Chapter 11, the
31. In discussing the role that modem Chapter 11 is playing, it is useful to distinguish
the legal entities in Chapter 11 from those that are not. The failure to do this will make it
appear that Chapter 11 is playing a role that it is not. Enron provides an illustration. The bulk
of Enron's assets were put up for sale shortly after it filed for bankruptcy. These asset sales
raised $3.2 billion. See Enron Corp., Disclosure Statement for Amended Joint Plan of
Affiliated Debtors 227-28 (Sept. 18, 2003).
There are only three assets of any consequence that will not be sold. These are the
equity stakes Enron holds in two small pipeline companies, one based in the United States
and one based abroad, and a utility company in Oregon. Enron's equity interest in these
businesses is likely to be distributed to creditors as part of Enron's plan of reorganization.
See, e.g., Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Board Approves Proposal to Create New
International Company (May 9, 2003) (on file with authors). The BRD will classify Enron as
an entity that successfully emerges from Chapter 11 on the ground that these three
businesses will not be sold. But one should not conclude that Enron's Chapter 11 is doing
anything to preserve the value of these discrete businesses as going concerns. The utility
company and the small pipeline companies in question are stand-alone corporations. They
are not in Chapter 11. They are solvent and not in need of reorganization. There is not and
has never been a threat to their value as going concerns. Everyone-including their
creditors-is free to treat them as if Enron's Chapter 11 had never happened. A creditor of
Microsoft is indifferent to whether someone who owns a share of Microsoft files for
bankruptcy. Creditors of these three business are in the same position.
The relevant asset here is Enron's equity interest in these businesses. The only question
is how Enron's Chapter 1I will dispose of this asset: Will the stock be sold directly to an
outside purchaser or will it be distributed to Enron's creditors, who could then sell their
shares on the market? In neither case is Enron's Chapter 11 doing anything to preserve these
corporations as going concerns.
32. See Kris Hudson, Step One: Finding a New Leader, DENy. POST, June 9, 2002, at
K-04. The decision to hire the tumaround formally rested with the board, but the board
recognized that their fiduciary duties were owed to the creditors: "Realizing that their
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new CEO hired Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein to shop the business and
decided not to sell it only because it did not "create[] the most value for the
creditors."'33 The board of directors of the new corporation consists of the CEO,
two members appointed by the postpetition lender, and two members appointed
by prepetition creditors. Creditors were in control from beginning to end.
The air cargo carrier Kitty Hawk spent two years in Chapter 11, during
which time it pared back on its operations. When it emerged, the creditors
ended up in control of the business, the CEO was gone, and the equity was
wiped out. The possibility of an outright sale was present at every stage in the
reorganization process. 34 Metals USA was formed in the 1990s as an
amalgamation of a number of different metal processors. Industry experts
raised doubts about whether these businesses should have been brought
together in the first place. 35 In its Chapter 11 case, Metals sold assets worth
over $70 million, refocused on its core operations, converted debt into equity,
and put in place a new board of directors.
At this point, we have reviewed all but one of the large Chapter 11 cases
from 2002. The one that remains is Pillowtex. Pillowtex on its face seems the
2002 case that would support the traditional account of Chapter 11. The
manufacturer of some well-known textiles-Fieldcrest, Cannon and Charisma
sheets and Royal Velvet towels-Pillowtex filed for bankruptcy in 2000 in
order to "create a sustainable capital structure, improved manufacturing
operations, and profitability. '36 After some pruning of its assets, it emerged in
2002. The business continued to run the same plants, employ the same workers,
and maintain the old relationships.
But Pillowtex in the end does little to support the traditional account of
corporate reorganizations either. Pillowtex likely had little value as a going
concern. The going-concern value of Pillowtex cannot exceed the costs of
outsourcing the manufacture, sale, and distribution of their sheets and towels. It
cost millions to build Pillowtex's factories, hire its thousands of employees,
and create all the relationships needed for its manufacturing process, but these
have no value as a going concern in a world in which the towels, pillows, and
sheets can be made under the same label for less offshore. The "successful"
Chapter 11 from which Pillowtex emerged in 2002 only postponed the
inevitable. Pillowtex filed for Chapter 11 again in July 2003, and in this one its
allegiance needed to shift from ICG's shareholders to its creditors as ICG's financial
condition worsened, the directors made Curran their new chief executive officer ..." Id.
33. See Jeff Smith, ICG Hires Firm to Seek Buyers for Telecom, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS (Denver), Nov. 18, 2000, at lB.
34. See Haynes & Boone Press Release, Coming Out of the Clouds: Kitty Hawk
Emerges from Bankruptcy (Sept. 30, 2002).
35. See Corinna C. Petry, Metals USA: The Unravelling of a Rollup, METAL CENTER
NEWS, Oct. 1, 2002.
36. See Chapter 11 Filed, DIP. Financing Announced, Pillowtex Corp., BANKR.
DATASOURCE, Nov. 13, 2000.
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assets are being sold off piecemeal. 37
The lack of traditional reorganizations in the 2002 dataset does not prove
that they have disappeared altogether. It may be possible to find another dataset
that shows less dramatic change. The number of sales and preexisting deals in
2002 may have been unusually high and the number without apparent going-
concern value unusually low. But these basic features-high levels of sales and
preexisting deals and low going-concern value-will likely show up in any
dataset. While writing The End of Bankruptcy, we vetted our observations
against the large cases in the BRD that were filed in calendar year 2000, and
the picture was much the same. Moreover, the interviews we conducted then
with reorganization lawyers confirmed these findings and their experience
extended across a wide range of cases over the course of multiple years.
Take any set of large Chapter 11 cases and the changes appear. Consider,
for example, the seven largest cases filed in 2002.38 Four of these cases now
have emerged from bankruptcy-NTL, Conseco, Global Crossing, and Kmart.
They tell the same story as the larger dataset of cases ending in 2002. Two of
these, NTL and Conseco, were prearranged bankruptcies. Global Crossing was
a sale. Kmart is a business that likely has little value as a going concern in a
world in which it must compete against businesses such as Target and Wal-
Mart.39 Moreover, Kmart illustrates the extent of creditor control in modern
Chapter 11 cases. Indeed, Kmart left Chapter 11 with the CEO of its principal
creditor as the chairman of its board.4 0
Three of the largest seven cases that filed for Chapter 11 in 2002 are still in
bankruptcy. The massive frauds in two of these cases-Adelphi and
Worldcom-made going-concern sales infeasible. United's Chapter 11 was
driven in the first instance by the special rules that give debtors
(inappropriately, in our view) a chance to shortchange employees and lessors.
We do not see asset sales or preexisting deals here, but none of these cases can
be considered paradigmatic reorganizations either. All three have a dynamic
37. Details of the auction are available at http://www.pillowtex.com (last visited Nov.
29, 2003).
38. To give another example: Bankruptcy Week reports on all bankruptcy filings by
publicly traded firms and large privately held firms on a weekly basis. The last issue that was
in print at the time of this Reply reports three filings. One (Reback Networks) is a
prenegotiated bankruptcy under which creditors will receive 95% of the equity of the
reorganized business. The other two (Piccadilly and Radio Unica) are going-concern sales.
See Bankruptcy Filings, BANKR. WEEK 2, Nov. 3, 2003. Indeed, Bankruptcy Week has a
column each week devoted to "Purchase Agreements." See id. at 3.
39. We discuss Kmart explicitly in The End of Bankruptcy. See Baird & Rasmussen,
supra note 1, at 765; see also Kmart's Toughest Sell, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE (May 15,
2003), available at http://uk.news.yahoo.com/030515/244/e02wv.html (quoting an industry
analyst as opining that "Kmart wasn't viable when they went into bankruptcy, and they
aren't viable now") (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
40. Kmart's chairman and CEO is Edward Lambert. He is the Founder, Chairman, and
Chief Executive Officer of ESL Investments, a hedge fund that acquired a major stake in
Kmart by buying up its debt. We discuss Kmart in greater detail below.
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utterly different from what we saw only a few years ago.
Rather than being dispersed and unable to work together, the creditors are
firmly in control. In Adelphia, the board hired a new CEO with an enormous
benefits package at the direction of the creditors' committee and over the strong
opposition of the shareholders. Early in the case WorldCom's board had to hire
a chief restructuring officer. The DIP financing agreement insisted that the
board hire such an officer but left the choice entirely up to the board-as long
as it was a person on the list of three offered by the DIP lender. In United, the
board oversaw the renegotiations with the unions, but the sword of Damocles
was held by J.P. Morgan through the financial covenants in its DIP financing
agreement.
As others have pointed out, many of the characteristics of Chapter 11
persist even as the purpose it serves changes. 41 Negotiations still take place in
Chapter 11, and part of the judge's job is to keep these negotiations on track.42
Eliminating out-of-the-money creditors and resolving intracreditor fights have
long been part of Chapter 11. One can find a Pillowtex here and there. But none
of this should obscure the magnitude of what has changed or the need to
explore why this change has taken place. The most important of the long-term
changes has been the change in the value financially distressed businesses have
as going concerns.
II. ASSET SALES AND GOING-CONCERN VALUE
Preservation of going-concern value rests at the heart of the standard
justification for Chapter 11. A going-concern surplus exists to the extent that
the expected value of the business's ongoing operations exceeds the value that
could be generated by putting the assets to some other use. LoPucki asserts that
The End of Bankruptcy takes a view of going-concern value that is too narrow
and that neglects some of the ways in which a business can have it. In
particular, he argues that fungible assets and relationships are a source of value
to many financially distressed businesses and that close study will show how
Chapter 11, as traditionally understood, will preserve them. We look at fungible
assets and relationships in turn.
A. Fungible Assets
In this section, we accept LoPucki's invitation to focus on a particular case,
In re 26 Trumbull Street.43 We use it to examine the extent to which a
41. See, e.g., Michele Dickerson, The Many Faces of Chapter 11: A Reply to Professor
Baird, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
42. Miller and Waisman, supra note 5, focus on these in their response to The End of
Bankruptcy.
43. 77 B.R. 374 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987).
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financially distressed business' value as a going concern can arise from its
fungible assets and the extent to which a traditional reorganization (as opposed
to a going-concern sale) is needed to preserve it.
The restaurant that occupied the space at 26 Trumbull Street, in Hartford,
Connecticut, went through bankruptcy twice during the 1980s.44 In both cases,
the same trustee was appointed to dispose of the assets. The time between the
two sales was quite short, and the individual assets themselves did not change
appreciably. Nevertheless, the first time a single buyer was willing to pay a
premium to acquire the restaurant's equipment and furnishings along with the
lease of the space, while the second time the assets were sold piecemeal for
merely a small fraction of the price received at the first sale. The difference
between the first and second bankruptcy shows how going-concern value
comes into being, how it can be lost, and why traditional reorganizations can do
so little to preserve it.
The story begins well before the first bankruptcy. Hubbard's Park opened
its doors in 1980. At first, it thrived. Hubbard's was both the place where
politicos hung out and the center of nightlife in the city. 45 All was well for
several years. Then the restaurant changed hands and its fortunes plummeted.
Within a year, the restaurant closed and filed for bankruptcy. At the time of the
first bankruptcy, it seemed the problems of Hubbard's could be tied to the bad
management that had run the restaurant for just a short time. Replace them, and
the winning formula would return.
What was being sold at the first auction was a restaurant with an
established track record, not only used restaurant furnishings and equipment. A
buyer only had to dust everything off and then open for business. The menu
could stay the same. The furniture, the bar, the espresso machine, and the d6cor
all worked together. The only thing the space at 26 Trumbull Street needed was
a return to competent management. Instead of buying an empty shell and
spending hundreds of thousands of dollars outfitting the place, one could
acquire a "turn-key operation"--a restaurant with an established track record
for less than $200,000.46
At the time of its first bankruptcy, Hubbard's appeared to be a viable
business that could generate more than the value of its hard assets in a
piecemeal sale. But the cause of the financial distress that brought about the
44. LoPucki discusses only the first bankruptcy. As the discussion below makes clear,
we believe that one must look at both, as well as at the other restaurants that later occupied
the site, to understand why few financially distressed businesses have going-concern value
and why sales are the best way to preserve it even when they do.
45. Interview with John Neil, 26 Trumbull Bankruptcy Trustee (July 24, 2003); see
also Closed City Restaurant May Reopen, HARTFORD COURANT, June 5, 1992, at D4.
46. The trustee in both cases, John Neil, used exactly this expression--"tum-key
operation"-to distinguish the first bankruptcy case from the second. Interview with John
Neil, supra note 45. The cost for refurbishing a restaurant at a location like that at 26
Trumbull Street usually ranges between $500,000 and $1 million. Interview with Robert
Maffuci (Sept. 9, 2002).
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bankruptcy-the bad managers-required a sale to preserve whatever going-
concern value existed. The claim of The End of Bankruptcy was both that
financially distressed businesses typically have little or no going-concern value
and that, even when they do, sales provide the simplest and often the best way
of preserving it. The going-concern sale of the restaurant at 26 Trumbull Street
vividly illustrates the second idea.
The speedy failure of the restaurant after the first bankruptcy suggests that
Hubbard's did not have any going-concern value after all. But even if the
restaurant had value as a going concern, that value had little to do with the hard
assets themselves. The original cost of the carpeting or the wall covering is
irrelevant. The cost of bringing these together bears no necessary relation to
how much going-concern value exists. Moreover, their value anywhere else is
almost nonexistent. What matters is whether together at this location they
create a mood that leads people to want to eat there.
The trustee conducted a piecemeal sale in the second bankruptcy. By this
time potential investors realized that this restaurant's moment had passed.
There was no shortage of people who wanted to run a restaurant at 26 Trumbull
Street, but no one wanted to run this restaurant. The equipment and furnishings
no longer had any value kept together. Piecemeal sales are the order of the day
for restaurants that close their doors.
In the case of 26 Trumbull Street, a succession of new owners failed to find
a winning formula. Jonathan's became Metro Park Caf, which in turn became
the Blue Star Caf6. In none of them was there any going-concern value. A
business that cannot generate enough money to pay its ongoing expenses is
worthless, no matter how much it cost to build. Increasingly, those who try to
open a stand-alone restaurant and run it with the management system they
develop on their own fail. Successful restaurants are more often the creation of
those who have opened other restaurants and have a management system that
they can replicate.47
The space at 26 Trumbull Street became successful only when Rob
Maffuci and his family acquired it in 1996. Already the owners of a number of
successful restaurants, they brought their knowledge to the space and opened
Vito's by the Park. Maffuci redid the dining space to take maximum advantage
of the view, including a large mural that mirrored the view of Bushnell Park
through the restaurant's windows. 48 Maffuci added a piano bar and created a
carry-out business during lunch. Complimentary pizza has made it one of the
favorite happy hour spots in Hartford. Today it is a successful business that
employs thirty-five. Already seven years old, Vito's is now well into middle
47. We made this point explicitly in The End of Bankruptcy and used restaurants as one
of our examples. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 764 n.66 (citing Shirley Leung,
Food Fight: Local Restaurants Find Big Chains Eating Their Lunch, WALL ST. J., July 9,
2002, at Al).
48. Part of Maffuci's genius included his ability to do an initial makeover of the
restaurant on a tiny budget ($120,000) within a small time frame (40 days).
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age.
The experience Maffuci and his family gained running their other
restaurants allowed them to open Vito's with the smallest possible capital
investment and then keep overhead low. The motivated and loyal staff is
smaller than at restaurants of comparable size. Much of Vito's value as a going
concern depends upon Rob Maffuci remaining in place. Maffuci is a creative
Italian chef who offers traditional osso bucco along with his own creations such
as apricot shrimp. He has a prominent place in Hartford's civic life.
Notwithstanding his passion and enthusiasm, Maffuci is not a dreamer. Trained
as an electrical engineer, Maffuci has put systems in place that have kept food
costs down and waste to a minimum. In addition, he continuously develops
sidelines to the business (such as take-out and-lunchtime deliveries) that add to
the bottom line. The combination of skills that Maffuci brings to Vito's is hard
to teach. If they could be easily learned, far fewer restaurants would fail.
Vito's depends on Maffuci, and Maffuci will not work there for someone
else.49 Vito's today has going-concern value, and this value likely cannot be
preserved in a going-concern sale. But this chapter in the history of 26
Trumbull Street provides no comfort to someone looking to justify the
traditional account of corporate reorganizations. Maffuci is in no need of
Chapter 11. Vito's is thriving.
The lesson to be drawn from 26 Trumbull Street is a general one. Small
businesses in Chapter 11 have little going-concern value, and sales are usually
the best way to preserve whatever value exists. Chapter 11 reorganizations do
not save businesses in the way that the equity receivership saved nineteenth
century railroads. 50 Edward Morrison has looked at all operating corporations
that filed Chapter 11 petitions in the Eastern Division of the Northern District
of Illinois in 1998.51 Morrison uses interviews and other techniques to take the
pulse of each business and concludes that these small businesses, like large
ones, have little in the way of going-concern value. The typical business is a
construction subcontractor who has no equipment beyond a truck and hand
tools. With no permanent employees, she hires people for specific jobs after
winning a contract. The owner-manager has many relationships with other
builders and suppliers, but these relationships reside with the owner-manager.
They do not depend upon the continued existence of the corporation she is now
running. They continue whether she runs the corporation that files for
bankruptcy or a new one created shortly thereafter. When we survey this
49. As we note in Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority
Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921,
923-24 (2001).
50. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost,
1999 SuP. CT. REV. 393, 402-06.
51. See Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision-Making: An Empirical Study of
Small Business Bankruptcies (Aug. 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago) (on file with authors).
[Vol. 56:673
HeinOnline  -- 56 Stan. L. Rev. 688 2003-2004
CHAPTER II AT TWILIGHT
landscape, the elements needed for the traditional reorganization are missing
with respect to these businesses too. As Morrison puts it, "There are no
railroads here."'52
B. Relationships
We do see large businesses, such as Revere and Greyhound, go through
Chapter 11 and continue as operating entities for many years. That such
businesses continue as going concerns for an extended period after emerging
from Chapter 11 suggests that they have some value as going concerns. 53 If
they had none, there is no reason for them to stay together. Moreover, we can
identify potential sources of going-concem value. Large businesses have
thousands of employees. Each employee has multiple relationships with each
other and with the business' many suppliers and customers. This vast web of
relationships constitutes the firm. Large investments were required to bring it
into being and investments on a similar scale would be needed to replicate it.
The idea of value flowing from relationships fits with the conception of the
firm that Ronald Coase established long ago. A "firm," as Coase understood it,
consists of the "system of relationships which comes into existence when the
direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur. '54 Instead of the price
mechanism directing the flow of resources, an entrepreneur takes command of
them. The relationships, not the assets, are the firm. 55
52. See id. at 47.
53. Even here, however, we have to be careful. Many of the companies that LoPucki
identifies as successful reorganizations of the past completed Chapter 11 at a time when
asset sales were not as common as they are today. It may well be the case that, had these
cases occurred today, the business would have been sold to the highest bidder.
Even putting this aside, one cannot accept uncritically the notion that much going-
concern value existed in these cases. For example, at the time it filed, Revere was best
known for its copper-bottomed cooking ware. Revere sold this division to a business that
ultimately became WKI, one of the large businesses emerging from Chapter 11 in 2002. By
this time, RevereWare's manufacturing operations had been outsourced to a factory in
Indonesia. No matter how much it cost to build and no matter how much it cost to establish
the relationships, the value of a firm that makes RevereWare can never be more than the cost
of producing the same goods offshore. This division (albeit only a part of Revere) once again
illustrates the dynamic at work in cases such as Pillowtex and Glenoit.
54. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, in THE NATURE OF THE
FIRM: ORIGINs, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 22 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G.
Winter eds., 1993).
55. LoPucki states that we argue "going-concern value can exist only in conjunction
with firm-specific assets." LoPucki, supra note 3, at 652; see also id. at 659 ("Asset-
specificity is at the heart of Baird and Rasmussen's concept of the firm."). But our view is in
fact to the contrary. Specialized hard assets are not what generates going-concern value in
most businesses. This is the gist of our discussion of Ermen & Engels and the Ford Motor
Company. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 760-62, 769-72. Vito's provides a
further illustration. See also Douglas G. Baird, In Coase's Footsteps, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 23,
31 (2003) ("The reasons for bringing Fisher within GM's orbit had nothing to do with asset-
specificity and everything to do with minimizing production costs.").
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All firms have relationships; not all firms, however, have going-concern
value. Chapter 11 is traditionally defended on the grounds that it is needed to
preserve businesses with going-concern value, not all firms. To make the case
that a business has substantial value as a going concern, one must establish both
that the business' relationships are costly to replicate and that the business is
itself sound. Neither is necessarily true.
First, relationships may be relatively inexpensive to put in place. Nothing
about Coase's theory of the firm requires that the relationships that constitute
the firm be costly to create or replicate. Indeed, Coase's theory tells us that
unless these costs are low, production will take place outside the firm.
56
Moreover, as transaction costs go down, the upper bound on the value of
relationships of the firm goes down as well. The cost of hiring a janitorial
service puts a limit on the value a janitor brings to a firm.
Those who move to new jobs do incur transition costs. You need to find
where the water coolers are. But these costs can be exaggerated. Law
professors can move back and forth to teach at different schools in several
jurisdictions over the course of a few months. CEOs are regularly hired from
outside the industry. 57 Forming a business is, of course, hard. There is a critical
mass of relationships that takes time to develop. If you open a new restaurant,
even at a location that used to be a restaurant, it takes a number of months to
train the workers, obtain suppliers, gain customers, adjust the menus, and so
forth. But these costs, too, are easy to overstate. 58 A restaurant has relationships
with a variety of vendors, but switching to new vendors is easy and cheap.59
The Internet has made it even easier and cheaper. Moreover, the same forces
that make these relationships easier to establish make it easier to sell a business
as a going concern.
Even where relationships would be expensive to build anew, one needs a
sound business plan to create going-concern value.60 An absence of going-
concern value is a common characteristic of many of the businesses that were
56. As noted, one of the businesses LoPucki cites as having going-concern value-
Revere-provides a nice illustration of the point. The same cooking ware can be made by a
third party through contract as by the business itself.
57. WorldCom and United's CEOs, hired just after or just before the Chapter 11 filing,
are examples.
58. In 1913, when Ford Motor Company was one of the most profitable companies in
the world, it had an employee turnover rate of 380%. See DAVID A. HOUNSHELL, FROM THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM TO MASS PRODUCTION 1800-1932: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 257 (1984).
59. Even among the restaurants thatfail in Chapter 11, old owners are able to establish
another restaurant quickly more than a third of the time. See Douglas G. Baird, The New
Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
60. LoPucki slights the difficulty of crafting a successful business plan when he offers
that "[s]imply by itself adopting a better operating plan, the reorganizing firm can save its
low-level, firm-specific knowledge and expertise." LoPucki, supra note 3, at 655. Mainline
carriers in the airline industry still have yet to "simply adopt" an operating plan that
generates going-concern value.
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liquidated in Chapter 11 in 2002. WebVan's infrastructure cost hundreds of
millions to put in place, but it could not deliver groceries in a way that
competed successfully with ordinary supermarkets. Iridium spent billions
putting satellites in orbit and creating a vast network of receiving stations on
the ground. 61 Relationships were established with telephone companies
throughout the world, but Iridium proved to be worthless. Its value as a going
concern turned on whether it could compete with other technologies and it
could not.
In the end, one cannot rest Chapter 11 on the need to preserve
relationships. Not all relationships have value. Even in financially distressed
firms that have potentially costly and valuable relationships-firms that are
hard to find-a traditional Chapter 11 proceeding is not necessary to preserve
such relationships.
C. Asset Sales and Absolute Priority
A business that has developed an efficient way to manage dozens of
different hotel franchises does not usually encounter financial distress-its
competitors do. Even when the expertise does exist and the business is in
distress, creditors are better able to prevent fights among themselves that put
the assets in jeopardy. If all else fails, we can usually preserve going-concern
value with a going-concern sale. Creditors no longer fear that the failure to
reach a deal with current managers will lead to a piecemeal breakup of the
business in which value is lost. As we showed in Part I, the dominant feature of
the large corporate Chapter 11 today is the asset sale. A large corporation that
files for bankruptcy is in play. Selling a business in Chapter 11 is no longer a
last resort but an option to be exercised at any time if it is in the creditors'
interest.
Asset sales preserve a business' going-concern value in a way that
undercuts the liquidation/reorganization dichotomy that marks much discussion
about bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy scholars for years have viewed the choices
facing a corporation as either to reorganize consensually in order to preserve
going-concern value or have its assets sold piece by piece for a fraction of their
value. Such a fear is largely misplaced. We see sales of discrete divisions and
units, but only because they are thought to maximize value.62 Creditors may at
61. Like WebVan, Iridium is discussed in Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 767-68.
62. Comdisco reached an agreement to sell one of its principal businesses to Hewlett
Packard for $610 million before filing for bankruptcy. As has become commonplace, the
bankruptcy judge insisted that others have the chance to bid. An auction ensued and this
division was ultimately sold for $835 million to another buyer within several months of the
petition. See Kevin Murphy, SunGard Wins Comdisco Bid, Awaits Antitrust Ruling,
COMPUTERWIRE, Nov. 12, 2001. Comdisco then proceeded to find buyers for the rest of its
assets. See Thania Markes, Comdisco Plan Wins Court Approval, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003,
at 23.
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times decide that the market for a group of assets is depressed, 63 but, across the
broad range of cases, asset sales do not destroy going-concern value. Rather,
asset sales are a way to preserve what going-concern value may exist by putting
the corporation's assets into new hands.
Sales, as LoPucki points out, do place a value on the business today, thus
eliminating the option value of junior investors. 64 When there is an asset sale,
the proceeds are often less than what the most senior creditors are owed. Those
junior to them are often wiped out. If the sale had not taken place, the values
might have increased. Junior interests have value as long as there is no day of
reckoning.
This collapsing of all future possibilities into present value, however, is not
unique to asset sales. Regardless of whether there is an actual sale or the
hypothetical sale that takes place in a traditional reorganization, the absolute
priority rule requires a valuation in every case. This valuation collapses future
values to the present and fixes everyone's rights. Hence, even when we do not
have asset sales in large Chapter 11 cases, equityholders typically get wiped
out.65 This effect of the absolute priority rule generates strategic behavior that
63. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity:
A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343 (1992).
64. LoPucki focuses on how sales extinguish the rights of equityholders. As we note
below, however, equity is nearly always wiped out in modem, large Chapter I Is, even when
there are not asset sales. Nevertheless, LoPucki's observation about the importance of taking
the option value of junior investors into account is surely correct and applies equally to
junior creditors.
65. LoPucki's dataset once again makes this point clear. Of the businesses that
emerged with a plan formed in Chapter 11, equity is unequivocally wiped out in 17 of the 23
cases: Arch Wireless, CareMatrix, Classic Communications, Fruit of the Loom, Global
Crossing, ICG Communications, FLAG Telecom, Kitty Hawk, Mariner Post-Acute Network,
Pillowtex, Sun HealthCare, Teligent, Sterling Chemical, Sunterra, Weblink Wireless, Viatel,
and York. Equity is also wiped out in Fine Air (with the caveat, noted above, that the old
equityholder was a minority investor in the company that was the high bidder at the auction
conducted by the bankruptcy judge).
Equity did hold on to some stock in Oxford Automotive and perhaps in Derby Cycle as
well. Both, though coded as entering without prenegotiated plans, implement deals struck
before bankruptcy. In Carmike Cinema, equityholders retained some stock, but in that case
creditors were paid in full.
Metals USA is interesting in that it is one of the few corporations in which equity was
not wiped out. Old stockholders were given warrants. The exercise price of the warrants,
however, was so high that the old shareholders would exercise them only if the stock proved
valuable enough to pay the creditors in full. See Plan Summary, Metals USA, Inc., BANKR.
DATASOURCE, Oct. 1, 2002. Although the warrants would give the equityholders only 15%
of the equity in the end, the basic structure of the plan resembles not so much a traditional
one as one that implements Bebchuk options. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to
Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988).
Lodgian was the only insolvent business that entered bankruptcy without a preexisting
deal in which the equityholders received -seme equity. Here the equityholders mounted a
challenge to the rights of one creditor class to reach across different corporate entities. The
dispute resulted in a deal in which the equityholders received 3% of the new equity and
warrants. (The plan itself nominally wiped out the equity. Equity received its share as a
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is hard to overcome. 66 Hence, alternatives to the absolute priority rule (such as
relative priority) may make more sense. Bankruptcy scholars have paid too
little attention to this feature of the absolute priority rule. Understood in this
way, LoPucki's observation is well-taken, but it is not an objection to asset
sales. 67
Nor is it right to think that junior creditors resist sales. Under current law,
when a reorganization is imminent, the junior creditors, far from fearing a sale,
sometimes encourage it. By putting the business in play and stirring up
competition among potential buyers, they can end up with more than they
would in a traditional reorganization. In Budget's Chapter 11, for example, the
junior creditors were the ones pushing the sale.68 The sale to Avis generated a
premium commonly seen in corporate control transactions outside of
bankruptcy and left the general creditors with more than would a traditional
reorganization.
III. CONTROL RIGHTS IN CHAPTER 11
LoPucki envisions a Chapter 11 process where the board mediates the
interests of various constituencies. The board of directors is calling the shots.
The residual owners of the business cannot be identified with certainty, and the
board is well-positioned to take the interests of all into account. 69 LoPucki,
result of a side-deal with the creditor class.) This routine elimination of equity is yet another
way in which extant Chapter 11 practice deviates from that of fifteen years ago. See Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1990).
66. Donald Bernstein sets out the various forms of strategic behavior at work here in
Donald Bernstein, Presentation to the American College of Bankruptcy Lawyers,
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 28, 2003). He argues that, in large cases, financial instruments can
remove the costs associated with collapsing future values to the present in Chapter 11. His
approach, however, can be used when assets are sold as well as when businesses are
reorganized.
67. The importance of taking the option value of junior investors into account has, of
course, been known for a long time. Robert Swaine developed this idea during the 1920s.
See Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last
Decade, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 912-23 (1927). In a previous paper, we examined Swaine's
contribution to the law of corporate reorganizations. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 50,
at 401-08. It would also be a mistake to think that this feature of bankruptcy law is
something that we have neglected. We provide a detailed account in Baird & Rasmussen,
supra note 49.
68. The majority of the unsecured creditors were strong supporters of this deal. Indeed,
they were willing to sign a lock-up agreement with Avis before the petition committing
themselves to supporting the sale, but they did not sign such an agreement as it was not in
Avis' interest. Such a lock-up agreement would disqualify them from service on the
creditors' committee. Their claims were large enough to ensure them of representation on the
committee and, by being on the creditors' committee, they could ensure that the sale would
go through without a hitch.
69. Someone must affirmatively govern the firm. Bankruptcy reorganization solves the
governance problem by leaving the directors in control of the firm and imposing on them
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however, overstates the difficulty in ensuring that decisions are placed in the
right hands, understates the constraints under which the boards of financially
distressed corporations operate, and fails to acknowledge the realities of current
practice. We address each in turn.
A. Residual Owners
The law of corporate reorganizations offers a solution to the collective
action problem that exists when too many creditors chase too few assets. But
financial distress can be anticipated, and debtors can arrange their affairs in
such a way that minimizes this collective action problem. No collective action
problem exists when a business has a sole owner and no creditors. No legal
regime is needed to preserve relationships in this environment, no matter how
valuable they are. Most businesses have multiple parties with a stake in the
assets. For businesses that have few debts relative to their assets, we can again
look to the shareholders to make sensible decisions. They enjoy the benefits
and bear the costs of almost any decision they make. 70 Similarly, a business
may be so hopelessly insolvent that a single senior creditor is effectively the
residual owner.
As LoPucki properly points out, we must confront those situations in which
there is no readily identifiable residual owner. By the time WebVan shut down,
the unsecured creditors received less than fifty cents on the dollar. Hence, for
some period of time, they were the residual owners of the business but at no
point were they involved in decisionmaking. The person making the decision
about whether to keep the business running, whoever it was, could not have
been the residual owner. Observing that no residual owner existed, however,
does not itself tell us that the decisionmaking that took place was bad. Nor does
it suggest the decisions were inconsistent with the interests of the general
creditors.
It is easy to criticize WebVan for its initial missteps and the wasteful
spending of its CEO, but none of this had anything to do with the choice facing
WebVan in its last months-how long to keep the business running. As its
founders observed early on, WebVan was the kind of business that would be
worth ten billion dollars or nothing.7 1 The risks and the potential returns were
high. In such an environment, one of the most important issues in designing the
allocation of control rights is ensuring the shutdown decision is made at the
right time. You do not want to give up on a huge capital investment, but, at
fiduciary duties to all parties in interest. Under the loose supervision of a disinterested judge,
the directors impose their decisions on the usually hopelessly conflicted parties. See
LoPucki, supra note 3, at 665.
70. Of course, this is true only at first approximation. Any debt in a firm's capital
structure creates an overinvestment incentive. By and large, creditors can protect their
interest via price and contract terms.
71. See RANDALL E. STROSS, EBoYs 43 (2000).
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some point, you have to cut your losses.
At the time they invested, WebVan's general creditors, like everyone else,
wanted to ensure that this decision was made at the optimal time. But they
would not necessarily bargain for the right to make this decision themselves the
moment they became residual owners. Among other things, they likely lack the
expertise to make this decision at the optimal time. But the locus of the
decision does not need to reside with them. Nor does the mechanism even have
to entrust this decision to a single person. A variety of mechanisms can be put
in place outside of bankruptcy to induce value-maximizing decisions. 72
In the case of WebVan, the decision to close WebVan was formally
entrusted to equityholders or those beholden to equityholders. They have an
incentive to keep the business running too long. But this picture is too simple.
Start-up businesses like WebVan require cash. The managers running WebVan
ultimately closed it down because they could not find additional providers of
cash to keep it running. The managers would have a bias in favor of keeping
the business running. The senior creditors would have a bias towards shutting it
down. Providers of new cash, however, at first approximation, have exactly the
right incentive. They will be willing to provide an additional dollar as long as
the risk-adjusted return on that dollar yields them a competitive return.
WebVan might lack anyone who is a residual owner, but it can nevertheless
create a mechanism that yields sensible decisions by forcing those in control to
return to capital markets to keep it running.
WebVan's unsecured creditors did not receive repayment in full, but this
itself tells us nothing about whether control rights were allocated in a way that
ensured it was shutdown at the right time. The optimal time to shut WebVan
down turns on its liquidation value relative to the discounted present value of
its future earnings, not on the relationship of liquidation value to the amount the
unsecured creditors were owed.73 To the extent that unsecured creditors would
tend to shut the business down at the wrong time, one should not expect them
72. We develop the idea that control rights can be allocated coherently even when
multiple parties possess powers to affect decisionmaking in Baird & Rasmussen, supra note
49. We do not rest on the idea that a single residual owner exists in every case. Hence, the
argument that such creatures do not exist is neither here nor there.
In this respect, LoPucki seems to focus too heavily on the work one of us did in the
early 1980s. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations
and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of
Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 108-09 (1984). That work, while
discussing the need to create mechanisms that allow disparate owners to act as one,
emphasized the advantages of ensuring that decisionmakers were residual owners who bore
the costs and benefits of any decision they made.
73. Shutting a business down at the right time is an optimal-stopping problem. In
comparing the liquidation value and the going-concern value, one needs to take into account
the option value associated with waiting. As a result, a business should be kept running even
when the discounted value of its future earnings is less than its liquidation value. Douglas G.
Baird & Edward Morrison, Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 356 (2001).
For a formal proof, see Morrison, supra note 51, at 54-55.
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to have the power to do SO. 74
The law allows parties great freedom to craft investment contracts in a way
that is to their liking. People learn with time. The investment contracts in the
typical large case are the product of careful design. Investors in large
businesses allow capital structures to emerge in which those who have the
power to make decisions are likely to make good ones. Moreover, the tensions
that might exist in cases such as WebVan if its control rights were allocated
incoherently, however, should not be exaggerated. Large businesses do not
ordinarily find themselves in situations in which the senior creditors want to
shut them down, while the junior ones do not.75
More often, the decision is one that, if correctly made, will benefit senior
and junior creditors alike. The business needs to find a chief restructuring
officer. The question is who the best person is. Creditors with diverse interests
can often agree on such questions or defer to someone who has more
experience. To say that control rights tend to be allocated coherently is to say
that those who have a voice in making this decision have both the skill and the
incentive to make it correctly. 76 Enron is one of the most expensive and
contested bankruptcies ever, but there was almost no disagreement with respect
to the single most important decision at the start of the case-a decision to sell
its trading operation to UBS. The sale went through without objection even
though UBS was not willing to offer any cash for a business that, at the time,
appeared to many to be worth billions.77
Nor should we assume that residual owners are hard to find in large
Chapter 1 1 cases. As a large business encounters financial distress, for
example, multiple institutional creditors often morph into a single revolving
credit facility. When we look at recent large, prenegotiated Chapter 11 cases,
one commonly observes that the senior bondholders are in fact the residual
owners for all practical purposes. They use Chapter 11 not because there is a
collective action problem but because it is the easiest way for them to
extinguish junior stakeholders that are out of the money. These are more than
half of all the nonliquidating Chapter I ls involving large businesses. The
74. One needs to be careful here. The right to call a loan, which many creditors have
merely when there are reasonable grounds for insecurity, is not the same as saying that this
right will be exercised whenever there is a default. Ordinarily, defaults merely set the stage
for negotiations. Even when they do not, they can force a shutdown only if the entrepreneur
is unable to return to the capital markets.
75. As we have noted, small Chapter 1 Is are significantly different in this respect.
76. We elaborate on these points in other work. See Baird, supra note 59; Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Corporate Governance, State-Contingent Control Rights and
Financial Distress (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors); Robert K.
Rasmussen, Secured Credit, Control Rights and Real Options (2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
77. Enron's massive trading operations reported earnings of $3 billion. At the time of
the filing, some might have suspected these were exaggerated, but few thought the business
was worthless.
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railroads of the nineteenth Century had dozens of different bonds covering
many different types of collateral. Capital structures today are better designed.
The direction of the change is unmistakable and it takes us away from the
traditional reorganization.
B. The Board of Directors
Inside of bankruptcy and out, directors formally make the important
decisions about the future of the business. One should not, however, mistake
this formal power with the question of whose interests are being served.
Directors look to the creditors when the business is in trouble. Even if the
directors are not actively involved in the business before it encounters financial
distress, they wake up when it does, and, at this point, their concerns about their
own liability (and the potential shortfall in the company's D & 0 insurance)
ensure that they take the interests of the creditors to heart. 78
Perhaps more importantly, while some businesses may emerge from
Chapter 11, the directors of these businesses do not survive. The board often
turns over during the course of the Chapter 11 case. 79 In any event, by the end
of the case, the plan of reorganization brings with it a new set of directors,
usually appointed by the creditors. 80 The old creditors typically hold a
78. See supra note 69.
79. For example, the largest Chapter I Is to date-WorldCom, Global Crossing, and
Adelphia among them-had a complete turnover of directors.
LoPucki properly points out that, in WorldCom, the directors, while newly appointed,
were independent of the creditors. WorldCom, however, is a special case. The creditors there
needed directors of stature and impeccable integrity to calm the regulatory waters and fend
off efforts of its competitors to shut it down. Verizon's general counsel, a former Attorney
General of the United States, testified against WorldCom before Congress. Under such
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the creditors would have brought on board another
former Attorney General of the United States, rather than some run-of-the-mill vulture
investor. To preserve the value of their collateral, they needed to fight fire with fire.
Compare The Worldcom Case: Looking at Bankruptcy and Competition Issues, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of William Barr,
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Verizon Communications), with The
Worldcom Case: Looking at Bankruptcy and Competition Issues, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Nicholas Katzenbach, Board
Member, MCI Telecommunications).
The appointment of independent directors in WorldCom hardly suggests that creditors
in the case had no control. Indeed, if a significant number of creditors in WorldCom had
been foolish enough to want to displace Katzenbach, all they would have had to do was
invoke their right to elect a trustee to run the business. A creditor can insist on the
appointment of a trustee as a matter of right in the presence of fraud. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104
(2003). Bankruptcy judges resist such a move if a stray creditor or two makes the motion but
not when the creditors' committee or any other significant constituent demands it.
80. Among the Chapter 1 ls that emerged in 2002 that did not come into bankruptcy
with a prenegotiated plan, we see creditors appointing a new board in the majority of cases.
Metals USA is a representative example. In that case, the plan provided for a new board of
directors, appointed by the creditors committee. Their first task was to look for a new CEO.
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controlling interest in the equity of the new company and use this right to
install a new board. The people they appoint are not independent people of
stature chosen to mediate among competing groups, but rather those whose
loyalty they can count on. Indeed, the creditors often pick themselves or their
employees.
Kmart's nine-member board of directors upon emergence from Chapter 11
is altogether typical. ESL Investments is the hedge fund that emerged with
control of Kmart. 81 The reorganization plan gave it the right to appoint four
directors. Edward Lampert, the head of ESL Investments, appointed himself,
two of his employees, and a major investor in ESL. The next largest investor,
Third Avenue Management, was able to place one of its employees on the
board. Together, they controlled the board and ensured the election of Lampert
as chairman.82 During the months since Kmart's emergence from Chapter 11,
Lampert has exercised control and appointed a number of ESL employees to
key management positions.8 3 Many of the changes are long overdue financial
controls that benefit everyone, but nothing suggests that Lampert is doing
anything other than watching out for his own majority stake in the reorganized
business.
Even when the business remains publicly traded (and it often does not),
creditor control is much in evidence. Pillowtex provides a representative
example. Its board upon emergence from bankruptcy consisted of seven
members. Three were executives from Oak Tree Capital, the vulture fund that
acquired a large stake in the business during Chapter 11, and another was a
senior vice president of Lehman Brothers, a large secured creditor in the case.84
One can imagine a world in which legal rules with teeth ensured that board
members looked beyond their narrow self-interest, but this is simply not the
world facing the vast majority of the businesses that emerge from Chapter 11
today.8 5 Under current law, vulture investors and those who work for them do
Nelson Antosh, Metals USA Shrinks, Exits Bankruptcy, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 5, 2002, at
Bus. 1. Creditors also appointed new boards in FLAG Telecom, Kitty Hawk, Lodgian,
Mariner Post-Acute Networks, Pillowtex, Sun HealthCare, Sunterra, and Weblink Wireless.
This list is not exhaustive. However desirable it might be to have a reorganization law that
uses a board to preserve relationships, current Chapter 11 as practiced does not do this, at
least not by the time the case is over.
81. ESL acquired control by buying up $400 million of Kmart's debt and agreeing to
invest an addition $100 million after the case emerged from Chapter 11.
82. See Edward S. Lampert Appointed Chairman of the Board, Kmart Holding Corp.,
PR NEWSWIRE, May 6, 2003.
83. Karen Dybis, Kmart Adds Financial Control, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 9, 2003, at IC.
84. See Leticia Leizens, Creditors Set to Take Over Pillowtex as It Exits Chapter 11,
HOME FURNISHINGS NEWS, May 6, 2002, at 5; Leticia Leizens, Investment Bank is Betting on
Big Payoff with Pillowtex, HOME FURNISHINGS NEWS, Jan. 14, 2002, at 28.
85. Directors are almost never held liable for violating their duty of care. See Edward
B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv.
1009 (1997). Moreover, to the extent the case law speaks expansively of fiduciary duties, it
is to underscore the obligations that directors of distressed businesses owe to creditors. See,
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not act as if they owe any duty to the world at large. They are not an altruistic
or sentimental lot, and they are most unlikely to face legal liability from
advancing their own agenda to the exclusion of others. 86 The Board may be in
the saddle, but the whip is in the creditors' hands.
CONCLUSION
When we examine the large businesses that enter Chapter 11 today, we can
no longer rest on the comfortable homilies of the past. Modem bankruptcy
judges oversee auctions of going concerns and implement prenegotiated plans
of reorganization with consummate professionalism, and we should admire the
work they do. But Chapter 11 no longer serves anything like the role commonly
ascribed to it. A court-conducted sale of Fruit of the Loom in which the high
bidder is Warren Buffett bears no resemblance to an equity receivership. Even
in those cases that look most like a traditional large corporate reorganization,
the stakes are quite small. A collection of Marriotts and Holiday Inns is nothing
like a railroad.
In examining the nature of the change in the large corporate Chapter I Is of
2002, we see that fundamental forces at work in the economy have made the
traditional reorganization increasingly obsolete. Railroads had enormous going-
concern value and incoherent capital structures, while facing primitive capital
markets. Today's businesses can be replicated with virtual businesses that
organize production through the marketplace over the Internet. Any going-
concern surplus can be captured for creditors via a sale.
Of all the cases to leave Chapter 11 in 2002, the one that most resembles a
traditional reorganization is Pillowtex. Many plants were in small communities
that depended mightily on them. Pillowtex's Chapter 11 reorganization was a
two-year long effort to mediate the relationships among employees, suppliers,
and others. It brought together diverse interests, and a plan emerged that gave
the business its best chance going forward. But forces are at work that even the
best intentioned cannot stop. In the end, there was nothing bankruptcy could do
to save Pillowtex. The value it once had as a going concem was gone. For
better or for worse, the role that Chapter 11 can play in today's economy has
little or nothing to do with reorganizing railroads or saving factories in small
towns. Traditional reorganizations are all but gone. The end of bankruptcy is
indeed upon us.
e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992).
86. Dictum in the case law suggests boards should look out for others, as do any
number of normative theories. But our focus here is descriptive, and directors in the position
that these vulture investors occupy are not, as a practical matter, ever found liable for
violating their duty of loyalty. Among other things, there are few decisions where these
directors would be subject to conflicting loyalties.
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